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1
1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce and study three solution concepts for cooperative games with random
payoffs. An example of a cooperative situation with uncertain payoffs is the following. Two firms
will be temporarily working together in an R&D project. Although the profit of this project is yet
uncertain, the firms sign a contract beforehand in which their profit shares are written down.
Cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced in Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000). In
these games the payoff to a coalition is not known with certainty and is modelled as a random variable.
Further, the preferences of the players and the possible allocations of the payoffs are of a specific type.
Another model of games where the payoffs to the coalitions are random variables is the model of
stochastic cooperative games as discussed in Suijs (2000). The difference between these games and
cooperative games with random payoffs lies in the assumptions on the preferences and the structure
of the set of possible allocations of the payoffs (see Timmer et al. (2000)).
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is a solution concept for cooperative TU games for which
several equivalent formulations exist. One of these formulations is that the Shapley value equals the
average of the marginal vectors. Suijs (2000) considered this formulation of the Shapley value but was
not able to extend it to his model of stochastic cooperative games because, among others, a marginal
vector of a stochastic cooperative game need not be uniquely defined. Nevertheless, the nucleolus,
a solution concept for TU games that we do not discuss here, has been successfully extended to
stochastic cooperative games (cf. Suijs (1996, 2000)).
Inspired by the equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for TU games we define three
solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs. These are the marginal value, the
dividend value and the selector value. We study properties of these solution concepts and give two
characterizations on subclasses of games. The first one is on the class of games where all players
have identical preferences of a specific ‘linear’ type. On this class of games with random payoffs the
three solution concepts coincide. The second one is a characterization on the class of one-person and
two-person games, where again the three solutions coincide. These two characterizations are based on
characterizations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games by Young (1985), and by Myerson
(1980), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Ortmann (1998), respectively. Further, an example shows
that the solutions may all be different for three-person games.
This paper is organized in four sections. In section 2 we briefly recall the main basic features of
cooperative games with random payoffs. The three solution concepts are introduced in section 3. In
section 4 properties of the solution concepts are studied and the two characterizations are provided.
Finally, an appendix contains the proofs that are omitted in the text.
2 Cooperative games with random payoffs
A cooperative game with random payoffs is a tuple (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N). N is the finite
player set. A coalition is a nonempty subset of N . The nonnegative random payoff to coalition S is
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denoted by R(S) and S is the set of coalitions with a nonzero payoff. The setA contains all possible
individual payoffs that a player may receive from the coalitional payoffs and αi is a function that
describes how player i compares two random payoffs. Below we explain these ingredients in more
detail.
Let N = {1, . . . , n}. Denote by |S| the cardinality of coalition S. Let L+ be the set of all
nonnegative random variables with finite expectation. The payoff zero for sure is denoted by 0.
Notice that 0 ∈ L+.
The payoffR(S) to coalition S is assumed to be an element of L+. S is the set of coalitions with
a nonzero payoff, S = {S ⊂ N |R(S) 6= 0, S 6= ∅}. We assume the following about the payoffs.
The reason for this assumption is explained in section 3.
Assumption 2.1 If R(T ) = 0 for some coalition T then R(S) = 0 for all coalitions S such that
S ⊂ T .
An allocation of the payoff R(S) to the members of S is a multiple pR(S) with p ∈ IRS and
where player i ∈ S receives piR(S). Such an allocation is efficient if
∑
i∈S pi = 1. For ease of
notation define ∆∗(S) = {p ∈ IRS|
∑
i∈S pi = 1}. The set A = {pR(S)|S ∈ S, p ∈ IR} contains
all the payoffs that a player may receive from an allocation of the coalitional payoffs with respect to
S. All nonzero payoffs inA are denoted byA−0 = {pR(S) ∈ A|p 6= 0}.
The preference relation of player i is denoted by %i and it has the following interpretation. If
X %i Y then agent iweakly prefersX to Y . If he is indifferent between them,X ∼i Y , then Y %i X
and X %i Y , and if he strictly prefers X to Y , X i Y then X %i Y and not X ∼i Y . We assume
the following about this preference relation.
Assumption 2.2 For all i ∈ N there exists a surjective, coordinatewise strictly increasing and
continuous function f i : IR→ IRS such that
1. f iS(t)R(S) %i f
i
T (t
′)R(T ) if and only if t ≥ t′, for all S, T ∈ S; t, t′ ∈ IR.
2. f iS(0) = 0 for all S ∈ S.
Some examples of preference relations that satisfy this assumption are the following. Let E(X)
denote the expectation of X . If X %i Y if and only if E(X) ≥ E(Y ), X, Y ∈ A, then f iS(t) =
t/E(R(S)) for all S ∈ S, i ∈ N , t ∈ IR, represents this preference relation. This type of preferences
is called ‘expectation preferences’.
A second example involves quantiles of random variables. The βi-quantile of the random variable
X is uXβi = sup{t ∈ IR|Pr{X ≤ t} ≤ βi} with 0 < βi < 1 such that u
R(S)
βi
> 0 for all S ∈ S.








these so-called ‘quantile preferences’. Notice that both expectation and quantile preferences have




S(1) for all t ∈ IR.
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Define the function αi : A × A−0 → IR by αi(pR(S), qR(T )) = f iT ((f
i
S)
−1(p))/q. It is the
unique number αi ∈ IR such that pR(S) ∼i αiqR(T ), for all i ∈ N , pR(S) ∈ A and qR(T ) ∈ A−0.
Further, defineαi(0, 0) = 1. We do not define αi(pR(S), 0),pR(S) ∈ A−0, because it can be derived
from assumption 2.2 that we have piR(S) i 0 if pi > 0 and 0 i piR(S) if pi < 0. Hence, there
exists no αi ∈ IR such that pR(S) ∼i αi · 0 = 0.
Some interesting and often used properties of the functions αi, i ∈ N , are given in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.3 For all players i ∈ N it holds that αi(hX,X) = h for any h ∈ IR, X ∈ A−0.
If for player i ∈ N the functions f iS , S ∈ S, are linear then
1. αi(pR(S), qR(T )) = pf iT (1)/(qf
i
S(1)) for all pR(S) ∈ A and qR(T ) ∈ A−0,
2. pR(S) %i qR(T ) if and only if p/f iS(1) ≥ q/f
i
T (1) for all pR(S), qR(T ) ∈ A.
Proof. Let i ∈ N , h ∈ IR and X ∈ A−0. By definition of αi it holds that hX ∼i αi(hX,X)X .
From assumption 2.2 we derive that the preference relation%i is monotone increasing and this implies
that h = αi(hX,X).
Secondly, let player i have linear functions f iS , S ∈ S. For pR(S) ∈ A and qR(T ) ∈ A−0 we get












where the first equality is by definition of αi and the other equalities follow from the linearity of f iS ,
S ∈ S. For pR(S), qR(T ) ∈ A we obtain
pR(S) %i qR(T )⇔ t ≥ t
′ with f iS(t) = p and f
i
T (t
′) = q⇔ p/f iS(1) ≥ q/f
i
T (1)
where the first equivalence comes from assumption 2.2 and the second one from the linearity of the
functions f iS , S ∈ S. 2
3 The marginal, dividend and selector values
The Shapley value for cooperative TU games is a solution for which several equivalent formulations
exist. Based on these formulations, we define three solutions for cooperative games with random
payoffs.
We start with some definitions. A cooperative TU game is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, . . . , n}
is the finite set of players, v(∅) = 0 and v(S) ∈ IR is the worth of coalition S. Let Π(N ) be the
set of all bijections σ : {1, . . . , n} → N of N , Sσi = {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}, i = 1, . . . , n, and S
σ
0 = ∅.














for all i ∈ N . For cooperative games with random payoffs we define marginal vectors as follows. Let
σ ∈ Π(N ) and G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N). Define Y σσ(1) = R({σ(1)}), player σ(1) receives













for i = 2, . . . , n. Y σσ(i) is the marginal contribution of player σ(i) to coalitionS
σ
i−1. This contribution
is the remainder of R(Sσi ) after the players in S
σ
i−1 received parts that they find equivalent to their





is not defined, that is, where Y σσ(k) 6= 0 and R(S
σ
i ) = 0. The marginal vector M
σ corresponding to
permutation σ ∈ Π(N ) is that allocation of R(N ) where player i receives a multiple of R(N ) that is
equivalent for him to Y σi : M
σ
i (G) = m
σ
i (G)R(N ) with
mσi (G) = αi(Y
σ
i , R(N )),
for all i ∈ N . Let GN be the class of games (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) with random payoffs and
with player setN . A solution for cooperative games with random payoffs is a function Ψ on GN such
that Ψ(G) is an allocation pR(N ) for the game G ∈ GN .
In a straightforward way we define the marginal value3 Φm for cooperative games with random






A second formulation ofφ(v) uses the dividends per capita dS(v) of the coalitionsS, as introduced
by Harsanyi (1959). These numbers are calculated in a recursive way:
dS(v) =
 v(S), |S| = 1,|S|−1 (v(S)−∑T(S |T |dT (v)) , |S| > 1.





for all i ∈ N . For a cooperative game with random payoffsGwe define the dividend per capita dS(G)
of coalition S as follows:
dS(G) =
 R(S), |S| = 1,|S|−1 [1−∑T(S∑j∈T αj(dT (G), R(S))]R(S), |S| > 1.
3In Timmer et al. (2000) this value is called the Shapley value. Here, we consider three values based on the Shapley
value for cooperative TU games. To avoid confusion, we have renamed this value as the marginal value.
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The dividend per capita of a one-person coalition is equal to its payoff. If S contains more than one
player then we start with its payoff R(S). Given a subset T of S, T 6= S, we give each player j ∈ T
the dividend per capita dT (G) expressed as a multiple of R(S). After we have done so for all sets
T ⊂ S, T 6= S, we divide the remainder of R(S) by |S| to obtain the dividend per capita. The







for all i ∈ N . Player i receives the dividends per capita, expressed in multiples of R(N ), of all the
coalitions to which he belongs.
A third formulation is given by Derks, Haller and Peters (2000) who show that the Shapley value
is the average of the so-called selector vectors. Define 2N = {S|S ⊂ N} and ∆S(v) = |S|dS(v), the
dividend of coalition S. The function γ : 2N \ {∅} → N with γ(S) ∈ S for all coalitions S is called
a selector function. The family of selector functions for games with player set N is denoted by Γ(N )
and |Γ(N )| =
∏n
k=2 k





for all i ∈ N , player i receives the dividends of those coalitions S for which γ(S) = i, and we have
for all i ∈ N







For a cooperative game with random payoffsG define the dividend of coalition S, ∆S(G), by
∆S(G) =
 R(S), |S| = 1,[1−∑T(S∑j∈T αj(∆T (G)/|T |, R(S))]R(S), |S| > 1.
The dividend ∆S(G) of a one-person coalition S is equal to its dividend per capita, namely R(S).
For coalitions S with more than one player we take a subset T of S. The dividend ∆T (G) is divided
equally among the players in T . Player j ∈ T receives the amount αj(∆T (G)/|T |, R(S))R(S),
which is equivalent for him to ∆T (G)/|T |. The dividend of coalition S is all that remains of R(S)
after the dividends of the subcoalitions T have been divided. The following lemma shows that the
dividend ∆S(G) is closely related to the dividend per capita dS(G).
Lemma 3.1 ∆S(G) = |S|dS(G) for all games G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) and any coalition
S.
Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) be a cooperative game with random payoffs and let S
be a coalition. We show by induction that ∆S(G) = |S|dS(G).
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If |S| = 1 then ∆S(G) = R(S) = dS(G) = |S|dS(G). Now assume that ∆T (G) = |T |dT (G)
















where the second equality follows from induction and the third equality from the definition of the
dividend per capita dS(G). 2
The selector vector Mγ(G) is defined by Mγi (G) = m
γ











for all i ∈ N .
A first remark on these definitions is that a marginal vector need not be a selector vector, as
opposed to the case for cooperative TU games. Secondly, notice thatMγ(G) need not be an efficient
allocation of R(N ) even if G is a game where all the functions f i are linear. The example below
illustrates this.
Example 3.2 Consider the game G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) where N = {1, 2, 3} and the
payoffs are R({1}) = R({2}) = 0, R({3}) = 1, R({1, 2}) = 2, R({1, 3}) = 3, R({2, 3}) = 1
and R(N ) ∼ U([3, 7]), that is, R(N ) is uniformly distributed over the interval [3, 7]. We see that
S = {{3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3},N} and A = {pR(S)|S ∈ S, p ∈ IR} by definition.
Let β1 = β3 = 1/2 and β2 = 1/4. Recall from section 2 thatuXβi = sup{t ∈ IR|Pr{X ≤ t} ≤ βi}
is the βi-quantile of the random variable X . All the players i ∈ N have quantile preferences, thus
f iS(t) = t/u
R(S)
βi
for all i ∈ N , S ∈ S, t ∈ IR. From this we obtain the maps αi for all i ∈ N .
The dividends of the various coalitions are ∆{1}(G) = ∆{2}(G) = 0, ∆{3}(G) = 1, ∆{1,2}(G) =
2, ∆{1,3}(G) = 2, ∆{2,3}(G) = 0 and ∆N(G) = −R(N )/20. Consider the selector function γ
defined by γ({i}) = i, i ∈ N , γ({1, 2}) = γ({1, 3}) = γ(N ) = 1 and γ({2, 3}) = 2. Then
mγ1(G) = α1(∆{1}(G), R(N )) + α1(∆{1,2}(G), R(N )) + α1(∆{1,3}(G), R(N ))
+ α1(∆N(G), R(N ))
= 0 + 2/5 + 2/5− 1/20 = 3/4,
mγ2(G) = α2(∆{2}(G), R(N )) + α2(∆{2,3}(G), R(N )) = 0 + 0 = 0 and for player 3 m
γ
3(G) =
α3(∆{3}(G), R(N )) = 1/5. The corresponding selector vector M
γ(G) = (3/4, 0, 1/5)R(N) is not
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an efficient allocation of R(N ). In fact, all the selector vectors in this example are not efficient but
the selector value is an efficient allocation of R(N ) (this is a corollary of theorem 4.4). 3
4 Properties and characterizations on subclasses of games
In this section we present properties of the solution concepts that we introduced in the previous section.
For two subclasses of games where the three solution concepts coincide we provide characterizations
of these solutions.
Let GN be a set of games (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) with player set N . A solution concept Ψ
on GN
(i) is called efficient if for all G ∈ GN , Ψ(G) = pR(N ) for some p ∈ ∆∗(N ).
(ii) is called symmetric if for all G ∈ GN , for all i, j ∈ N such that αi = αj and R(S ∪ {i}) =
R(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊂ N \ {i, j}we have Ψi(G) = Ψj(G).
(iii) satisfies anonymity if for all G ∈ GN and for all σ ∈ Π(N ) we have Ψ(Gσ) = σ∗(Ψ(G))
where Gσ = (N, (Rσ(S))S∈Sσ ,Aσ, (ασi )i∈N), R
σ(σ(U)) = R(U), Sσ = {σ(S)|S ∈ S},
Aσ = {pRσ(S)|p ∈ IR, S ∈ Sσ}, ασσ(i) = αi and (σ
∗(pR(N )))σ(i) = piR(N ) for i ∈ N and
p ∈ IRN .
(iv) satisfies the null player property if for all G ∈ GN , for all i ∈ N such that R({i}) = 0 and
R(S) = R(S \ {i}) for all coalitions S 6= {i} we have Ψi(G) = 0.
The three solution concept satisfy most of these properties.
Lemma 4.1 The marginal value Φm and the dividend value Φd are efficient, symmetric, and they
satisfy anonymity and the null player property. The selector value Φs is symmetric and satisfies
anonymity and the null player property.
Proof. We only show the efficiency of Φd. The remainder of the proof is left to the reader.
Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) be a game with random payoffs. The dividend per capita
of coalitionN is by definition






αj(dT (G), R(N ))
R(N ).
By lemma 2.3 we have






αj(dT (G), R(N ))

for all i ∈ N . Summing both sides over N gives∑
j∈N





αj(dT (G), R(N )).
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αi(dS(G), R(N )) = 1
where the last equality follows from (4.3). We conclude that Φd is an efficient allocation ofR(N ). 2
We introduce another property based on its counterpart for TU games as in Young (1985).
(v) A solution concept Ψ on GN satisfies strong monotonicity if for all i ∈ N and for all games
G,G′ ∈ GN such that4 Mσi (G) %i M
σ
i (G
′) for all σ ∈ Π(N ) we have Ψi(G) %i Ψi(G′).
Now we have the following result.
Lemma 4.2 The marginal value Φm satisfies strong monotonicity on the class of all games G where
f i is a linear function for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) and G′ = (N, (Q(S))S∈S′,A′, (αi)i∈N) be games
where all the functions f i are linear. Let i ∈ N be such that




for all permutations σ. If R(N ) = Q(N ) = 0 then Φmi (G) = Φ
m
i (G
′) = 0 because Φm is an




because 0 %i 0.
Next, consider the situation where R(N ) 6= 0 and Q(N ) 6= 0. By definition (4.4) equals
αi(Y
σ
i , R(N ))R(N )%i αi(Y
′σ
i , Q(N ))Q(N )
for all permutations σ where variables without (with) an accent refer to the game G (G′). Applying
statement 2 of lemma 2.3 gives
αi(Y
σ




i , Q(N ))/f
′i
N(1)














i , Q(N ))/f
′i
N(1)













i , Q(N ))
Q(N ) = Φmi (G′).
4We assume w.l.o.g. that the domains of the preference relations %i and of the functions αi, i ∈ N , can be extended to
include all possible individual payoffs in both games.
9
Similar reasoning shows that this result also holds if R(N ) = 0 and Q(N ) 6= 0 or if R(N ) 6= 0 and
Q(N ) = 0. 2
The following example shows that this result need not hold if one of the functions f i is not linear.
Example 4.3 LetG = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) andG′ = (N, (Q(S))S∈S′,A′, (αi)i∈N) be two
games with N = {1, 2}. Variables with accents refer to the game G′. The payoffs are such that
R({1}) ∼1 1/10R(N ), R({2}) ∼1 4/5R(N ), Q({1}) ∼1 1/10Q(N ) and Q({2}) ∼1 4/5Q(N ).
Let σi denote the permutation with σi(1) = i and σi(2) = 3 − i, i = 1, 2. The marginal vectors
are Mσ1(G) = (1/10, 9/10)R(N ), Mσ2(G) = (1/5, 4/5)R(N), Mσ1(G′) = (1/10, 9/10)Q(N )
and Mσ2(G′) = (1/5, 4/5)Q(N ). Then the marginal values are Φm(G) = (3/20, 17/20)R(N) and
Φm(G′) = (3/20, 17/20)Q(N).
We concentrate on player 1. Let f1N and f
′1
N be surjective, continuous and strictly increasing
functions such that
f1N (0) = 0, f
1
N(9) = 1/10, f
1
N(11) = 3/20, f
1
N(20) = 1/5,
f ′1N (t) = t/80, t ∈ IR
From item 1 of assumption 2.2 and from f1N (9) = 1/10, f
′1
N (8) = 1/10 and 9 > 8 it follows that




Similarly we obtainMσ21 (G) 1 M
σ2
1 (G




permutations σ. Once again by assumption 2.2 and by f ′1N (12) = 3/20, f
1
N(11) = 3/20 and 12 > 11
we get
Φm1 (G
′) = 3/20Q(N )1 3/20R(N ) = Φ
m
1 (G).
We conclude that the marginal value does not satisfy strong monotonicity. 3
The selector value and the dividend value are equal for games where all the players i ∈ N have
linear functions f i.
Theorem 4.4 If G is a game where all the players have linear functions f i then the selector value
and the dividend value coincide.
Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) be a game where f i is a linear function for all i ∈ N .
From lemma 3.1 we know that ∆S(G) = |S|dS(G) for all coalitions S. By the linearity of f i and by





































R(N ) = Φdi (G),
where the fourth equality follows from γ(S) ∈ S. 2
A corollary of this theorem is that Φs is an efficient solution for any gameGwhere all the functions
f i are linear.
Denote by GLIN the set of gamesG with player set N where all the players have identical linear
functions f i. The marginal, dividend and selector value coincide on this class of games.
Theorem 4.5 For all G ∈ GLIN we have Φm(G) = Φd(G) = Φs(G).
Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) ∈ GLIN . From theorem 4.4 we know that Φd(G) =
Φs(G). It remains to show that Φm(G) = Φd(G).
If R(N ) = 0 then Φmi (G) = Φ
d
i (G) = 0 for all i ∈ N because these values are multiples of
R(N ) = 0.
If R(N ) 6= 0 then define f = f i, i ∈ N . Also, define a corresponding cooperative TU game
(N, v) by v(S) = 0 if R(S) = 0, v(S) = 1/fS(1) if R(S) 6= 0 for all coalitions S and v(∅) = 0.
Let σ ∈ Π(N ) be a permutation of N . We show by induction that mσ(G) = mσ(v)/v(N ). For
R({σ(1)}) 6= 0 it holds that




where the second equality follows from statement 1 of lemma 2.3. ForR({σ(1)}) = 0 this result also


























1/fSσ2 (1)− 1/fSσ1 (1)
]
= (v(Sσ2 )− v(S
σ
1 )) /v(N )
= mσσ(2)(v)/v(N )
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forR(Sσ2 )) 6= 0. If R(S
σ
2 ) = 0 then alsoR(S
σ
1 ) = 0 andm
σ
σ(2)(G) = 0 = m
σ
σ(2)(v)/v(N ) holds for
the same reason as above.




R(Sσi ) for i = 2, . . . , k, k < n. Using induction

































































































If R(Sσk+1) = 0 then Y
σ




j ) = 0 for all
j ≤ k + 1 by assumption 2.1 and so mσσ(k+1)(G) = 0 = m
σ
σ(k+1)(v)/v(N ). We have shown by
induction that mσ(G) = mσ(v)/v(N ).
Similar reasoning as for the marginal vectors shows that αi(dS(G), R(N )) = dS(v)/v(N ) for all











and by (3.1) and (3.2)















for all players i ∈ N . 2
Furthermore, there exists a characterization of these solution concepts on the class of games
GLIN . This characterization is based on a characterization of the Shapley value for cooperative TU
games by Young (1985).
Theorem 4.6 The marginal value Φm is the unique solution concept on GLIN that satisfies efficiency,
symmetry and strong monotonicity.
Proof. From the lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 it follows that Φm satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong
monotonicity on GLIN .
To show the uniqueness, let Ψ be a solution concept on GLIN that satisfies efficiency, symmetry
and strong monotonicity. Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) ∈ GLIN and let (N, v) be the
corresponding TU game as in the proof of lemma 4.5. By efficiency there is a p ∈ ∆∗(N ) such
that Ψ(G) = pR(N ). Define ψ(v) = piv(N ) for all i ∈ N . This ψ is a solution concept on the
class of TU games SGN = {(N, v)|v ≥ 0, v(T ) = 0 ⇒ v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ T}. Further,
ψ satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity as defined for cooperative TU games by
Young (1985). In theorem A.1 of the appendix we show that the Shapley value φ is the unique
solution on SGN that satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Hence, ψ(v) = φ(v)
and Ψ(G) = φ(v)/v(N ) ·R(N ) = Φm(G) if v(N ) 6= 0. If v(N ) = 0 then we have R(N ) = 0. By
efficiency and symmetry we have Ψi(G) = 0 = Φmi (G) for all i ∈ N . 2
We will now turn our attention to games with random payoffs that need not have linear functions
f i, i ∈ N . The subgame of G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) restricted to coalition T is denoted by
GT = (T, (R(S))S∈ST ,AT , (αi)i∈T ) with ST = {S ∈ S|S ⊂ T}, AT = {pR(S) ∈ A|S ⊂ T}.
Let ḠN = ∪M∈2N\{∅}G
M be the class of cooperative games with random payoffs and player set
N , and all of its subgames. A sixth property for solution concepts on ḠN is based on the balanced
contributions property for cooperative TU games by Myerson (1980).
(vi) A solution concept Ψ on ḠN is said to have balanced contributions if for all games G ∈ GN ,
for all coalitions T ⊂ N and for all i, j ∈ T , i 6= j, we have
αi(Ψi(GT ), R(T ))− αi(Ψi(GT \{j}), R(T ))
= αj(Ψj(GT ), R(T ))− αj(Ψj(GT \{i}), R(T )).
We have the following results concerning two-person games.
Lemma 4.7 If G is a two-person game then Φm(G) = Φd(G) = Φs(G), the three solution concepts
coincide. These solutions have balanced contributions on ḠN with |N | = 2.
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Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) be a two-person game withN = {1, 2}. If R(N ) = 0
thenR({1}) = R({2}) = 0 by assumption 2.1. For any of the two permutations σ we have
Mσσ(1) = ασ(1)(R({σ(1)}), R(N))R(N) = ασ(1)(0, 0)R(N ) = 1 ·R(N )(= 0)
Mσσ(2) = (1− ασ(1)(0, 0))R(N ) = 0 ·R(N )(= 0)
and the average of these marginal vectors is Φm(G) = (1/2, 1/2)R(N ) = (0, 0). In a similar way
we can show that Φd(G) = Φs(G) = (0, 0) because these are also multiples of R(N ) = 0.
Now assume that R(N ) 6= 0. Let σ1(1) = 1, σ1(2) = 2, σ2(1) = 2 and σ2(2) = 1. The
corresponding marginal vectors are
Mσ1(G) = (α1(R({1}), R(N)), 1− α1(R({1}), R(N )))R(N)
Mσ2(G) = (1− α2(R({2}), R(N)), α2(R({2}), R(N )))R(N)




(1 + α1(R({1}), R(N ))− α2(R({2}), R(N )),
1− α1(R({1}), R(N)) + α2(R({2}), R(N)))R(N).
The dividends per capita are d{i}(G) = R({i}), i = 1, 2, for the one-person coalitions and for the
grand coalition dN(G) = 12(1− α1(R({1}), R(N ))− α2(R({2}), R(N )))R(N ). Therefore
Φd1(G) =
(














(1 + α1(R({1}), R(N))− α2(R({2}), R(N)))R(N ) = Φ
m
1 (G)
and similarly Φd2(G) = Φ
m
2 (G).
There are only two selector functions, namely γ1 and γ2 defined by γ1({i}) = γ2({i}) = i,
i ∈ N , γ1(N ) = 1 and γ2(N ) = 2. The dividends are ∆{i}(G) = R({i}), i = 1, 2, and
∆N(G) = (1− α1(R({1}), R(N ))− α2(R({2}), R(N )))R(N ). This leads to
mγ11 (G) = α1(∆{1}(G), R(N ))+ α1(∆N(G), R(N ))
= α1(R({1}), R(N)) + 1− α1(R({1}), R(N ))− α2(R({2}), R(N ))
= 1− α2(R({2}), R(N )),
mγ12 = α2(∆{2}(G), R(N )) = α2(R({2}), R(N )) and so, M
γ1(G) = Mσ2(G). Analogously, for
selector function γ2 we have Mγ2(G) = Mσ1(G). We conclude that the selector value Φs(G), the
average of the selector vectors, coincides with the marginal value Φm(G), the average of the marginal
vectors.
Finally, we check balanced contributions for the grand coalition N . By efficiency Φmi (G{i}) =
R({i}) for i = 1, 2. We have
α1(Φ
m
1 (G), R(N ))− α1(Φ
m
1 (G{1}), R(N ))
= (1 + α1(R({1}), R(N))− α2(R({2}), R(N)))/2− α1(R({1}), R(N))
= (1− α1(R({1}), R(N))− α2(R({2}), R(N)))/2
= α2(Φ
m
2 (G), R(N ))− α2(Φ
m
2 (G{2}), R(N )).
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We conclude that Φm has balanced contributions. 2
Moreover, we have the following characterization, which is inspired by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989) and Ortmann (1998).
Theorem 4.8 The marginal value Φm is the unique solution concept on ḠN with |N | = 2 that is
efficient and has balanced contributions.
Proof. Let |N | = 2. By definition, Φm is efficient and from lemma 4.7 it follows that Φm has
balanced contributions on ḠN .
To show the uniqueness, let Ψ be a solution concept on ḠN that is efficient and has balanced
contributions. If G ∈ ḠN is a one-person game then Ψ(G) = Φm(G) because of efficiency.
Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) be a two-person game. By efficiency there exists a vector
p = (p1, p2) ∈ ∆
∗(N ) such that Ψ(G) = (p1, p2)R(N ). Next to this, Ψ has balanced contributions:
α1(Ψ1(G), R(N ))− α1(Ψ1(G{1}), R(N ))
= α2(Ψ2(G), R(N ))− α2(Ψ2(G{2}), R(N )).
By efficiency we have Ψi(G{i}) = R({i}) for i ∈ N . Together with Ψ(G) = (p1, p2)R(N ) this
gives
p1 − α1(R({1}), R(N)) = p2 − α2(R({2}), R(N )).
Using p1 + p2 = 1 leads to
2p1 = 1 + α1(R({1}), R(N ))− α2(R({2}), R(N ))
from which we conclude that Ψ = Φm. 2
Of course, this characterization also holds for the dividend value and the selector value, as
lemma 4.7 indicates. For three-person games, the three solution concepts can all be different, as the
following example shows.
Example 4.9 Let G = (N, (R(S))S∈S,A, (αi)i∈N) be the three-person game with N = {1, 2, 3},
R({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N , R(S) = 1 if |S| = 2 and R(N ) is uniformly distributed over the closed
interval [3,7]. The players 1 and 3 have expectation preferences and for player 2 we have
f2S(t) =

t, |S| = 2,
2t/5, S = N, t ≤ 0,
t1/6/2, S = N, t > 0.
For this game the four solution concepts are
Φm(G) = (19/60, 11/30, 19/60)R(N ),
Φd(G) = (7/15− (1/2)1/6/3, 1/15 + 2(1/2)1/6/3, 7/15− (1/2)1/6/3)R(N ),
Φs(G) = (7/15− (1/2)1/6/3, 17/30− (1/2)1/6/3, 7/15− (1/2)1/6/3)R(N ).
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Notice that the selector value is not efficient. Further, Φsi (G) = Φ
d
i (G) for i = 1, 3. This is due to
the fact that both the players 1 and 3 have expectation preferences and so, linear functions f i. The
inequality Φs2(G) 6= Φ
d
2(G) comes from the preferences of player 2: ∆{1,2}(G) = 1 ∼2 1/2 ·R(N )
and d{1,2}(G) = 1/2 ∼2 (1/2)7/6R(N ). Therefore,
α2(∆{1,2}(G), R(N )) = 1/2 < 2(1/2)
7/6 = 2α2(d{1,2}(G), R(N ))
although ∆{1,2}(G) = 2d{1,2}(G). 3
A Appendix
In this appendix we provide a characterization of the Shapley value on the class of TU games
SGN = {(N, v)|v ≥ 0, v(T ) = 0 ⇒ v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ T}. This characterization is inspired by
the characterization of the Shapley value on the class of superadditive games by Young (1985) and we
use it in the proof of theorem 4.6.
Let CN be a set of TU games with player set N and let ψ be a solution concept on CN , that is,
ψ(v) ∈ IRN for all v ∈ CN . Then ψ satisfies
(a) efficiency if
∑
i∈N ψ(v) = v(N ) for all v ∈ C
N .
(b) symmetry if for all i, j ∈ N such that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊂ N \ {i, j} (i and j
are symmetric players) we have ψi(v) = ψj(v) for all v ∈ CN .
(c) strong monotonicity if for all i ∈ N and for all games v, w ∈ CN such that v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≥
w(S ∪ {i})−w(S) for all S ⊂ N , i /∈ S, we have ψi(v) ≥ ψi(w).
Theorem A.1 The Shapley value φ is the unique solution on SGN that satisfies efficiency, symmetry
and strong monotonicity.
In the proof of this theorem we need a lemma that we present below. First, we introduce some
definitions. Let the game (N, uT ) be the so-called unanimity game defined by
uT (S) =
 1, S ⊃ T,0, otherwise,
for all S ⊂ N . The unanimity games {(N, uT )|T ∈ 2N \ {∅}} form a basis of the class of all TU






For t ∈ {1, . . . , n} define ∆t(v) = maxT :|T |=t∆T (v). Let v
1 =
∑
T 6=∅∆|T |(v)uT . Clearly, v
1 is
symmetric, that is, v1(S1) = v1(S2) for all coalitions S1, S2 such that |S1| = |S2|.
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Let δT (v) = ∆|T |(v)−∆T (v) (≥ 0). Now we can write




Define the index k(v) = |{T |δT (v) > 0}|. Suppose player i ∈ N is such that
i /∈ ∩T :δT (v)>0T
and define the game wi = v +
∑
T 6=∅,i/∈T δT (v)uT . The following lemma shows that v ∈ SG
N
implies wi ∈ SGN and that k(v)− 1 is an upper bound of k(wi).
Lemma A.2
1. v ∈ SGN ⇒ wi ∈ SGN
2. k(wi) ≤ k(v)− 1
Proof. Let v ∈ SGN . Clearly, wi ≥ 0. It remains to show that
wi(Q) = 0⇒ wi(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ Q. (A.5)
Let Q be a coalition such that
wi(Q) = v(Q) +
∑
T 6=∅,i/∈T
δT (v)uT (Q) = 0.
Because v(Q), δT (v) and uT (Q) are all nonnegative numbers we have v(Q) = 0 and uT (Q) = 0 for
all coalitions T with i /∈ T . From v ∈ SGN we get v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ Q. Also, uT (Q) = 0
implies that Q 6⊃ T . But then S 6⊃ T for all S ⊂ Q and so, uT (S) = 0. We conclude that (A.5) is
satisfied.
To show the second item, notice that





















Hence, for all coalitions T
∆T (w
i) =
 ∆T (v), i ∈ T,∆|T |(v), i /∈ T.







for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore,
δT (w
i) = ∆|T |(w
i)−∆T (w
i) = ∆|T |(v)−∆T (w
i) =
 δT (v), i ∈ T,0, i /∈ T.
Now we get
k(wi) = |{T |δT (w
i) > 0}|
= |{T |δT (v) > 0, i ∈ T}|
≤ |{T |δT (v) > 0}| − 1
= k(v)− 1
where the inequality follows from i /∈ T for at least one coalition T with δT (v) > 0. 2
Now we can prove the characterization of the Shapley value on the class SGN .
Proof of theorem A.1. It is obvious that the Shapley value φ satisfies efficiency, symmetry and
strong monotonicity on SGN .
Let v ∈ SGN , then v =
∑
T 6=∅∆T (v)uT . Define for t = 1, . . . , n
∆t(v) = max
T :|T |=t
∆T (v), and δT (v) = ∆|T |(v)−∆T (v) (≥ 0).
Let v1 =
∑
T 6=∅∆|T |(v)uT . Now we can write
v = v1 −
∑
T 6=∅
δT (v)uT . (A.6)
Define the index k(v) = |{T |δT (v) > 0}|. Let g be a solution on SGN that is efficient, symmetric
and strongly monotonic. We show by induction on k(v) that g(v) = φ(v).
If k(v) = 0 then v = v1. Because v1 is a symmetric game, all the players in N are symmetric.
From efficiency and symmetry we obtain gi(v) = v(N )/n = φi(v) for all i ∈ N .
Now assume that g(v) = φ(v) for all games v ∈ SGN with k(v) ≤ k − 1, for some positive
integer k. Let v ∈ SGN be a game with k(v) = k. Define D = ∩T 6=∅,δT (v)>0T .
First, let i ∈ N \D. Define the game (N,wi) by




According to (A.6) we can rewrite this to




By lemma A.2 wi ∈ SGN and k(wi) ≤ k(v)− 1 = k − 1. Then
g(wi) = φ(wi) (A.7)
by induction.
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Let coalition S be such that i /∈ S. Then
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v1(S ∪ {i})−
∑
T 6=∅





= v1(S ∪ {i})− v1(S)−
∑
T 6=∅
δT (v) (uT (S ∪ {i})− uT (S))
= v1(S ∪ {i})− v1(S)−
∑
T 6=∅,i∈T
δT (v) (uT (S ∪ {i})− uT (S))
= wi(S ∪ {i})− wi(S).
From strong monotonicity we obtain gi(v) = gi(wi) and φi(v) = φi(wi). Together with (A.7) this
gives gi(v) = φi(v).
Second, let i, j ∈ D be two players and let S ⊂ N \ {i, j}. Then by definition
v(S ∪ {i}) = v1(S ∪ {i})−
∑
T 6=∅
δT (v)uT (S ∪ {i}).
Because uT (S ∪ {i}) = uT (S ∪ {j}) = 0 for all coalitions T with δT (v) > 0 and because
v1(S ∪ {i}) = v1(S ∪ {j}), the game v1 is symmetric, we get
v(S ∪ {i}) = v1(S ∪ {j})−
∑
T 6=∅
δT (v)uT (S ∪ {j}) = v(S ∪ {j}).
Any two players in D are symmetric players in v. By symmetry gi(v) = gj(v) and φi(v) = φj(v)
for all i, j ∈ D. Together with efficiency and with gk(v) = φk(v) for all k ∈ N \ D this implies
gi(v) = φi(v) for all i ∈ D. 2
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